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Different financial systems vary in the way they contribute to the process of resource 
allocation in the economy and in the risk-sharing pattern that they bring about. It would 
therefore be plausible to expect different financial systems to differ in the way they affect real 
economic activity. I hereby provide a theoretic framework for the comparison and analysis of 
output cycles under two alternative financial systems: an equity-based financial system (EFS), 
in which a mutual fund functions as a financial intermediary, versus a debt-based financial 
system (DFS), in which a bank plays that role. The research points that DFS generates larger 
output cycles and a higher expected output than EFS. The mechanism that generates these 
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   421. Introduction 
Financial systems play an essential role in the process of resource allocation in an 
economy. They transform household savings into investment funds for the corporate sector, 
thus providing the former a means for intertemporal consumption smoothing and enabling the 
later to carry out investment and production plans. Different financial systems vary in the way 
they carry out these functions, and in the risk-sharing pattern that they bring about. It would 
therefore be plausible to expect different financial systems to differ in the way they affect real 
economic activity. This paper provides a theoretic framework for the analysis and comparison 
of output cycles under two alternative financial systems: an equity-based financial system 
(EFS) versus a debt-based financial system (DFS).  
The EFS versus DFS debate is by no means a new one, and has given rise to a large body 
of literature. Among the contributors to this debate are authors such as Fama (1980), 
Goodhart (1993) and Miller (1998), who advance the view that EFS outdo DFS in terms of 
financial stability; Allen & Gale (1997), Bhattacharya, Fulghieri and Rovelli (1998), who 
compare the performance of different financial systems in achieving efficient intertemporal 
allocation of resources, and Allen & Gale (2000) - whose wide-ranging book provides a 
comprehensive survey of works in the realm. Nevertheless, the real macroeconomic activity 
implications of financial systems have, to the best of my knowledge, so far remained 
untreated.  
As reported by Allen & Gale (2000), the current trend is that of moving towards market-
oriented financial systems. The rapidly changing technological and regulatory environment 
gives rise to alternatives to banks, which have traditionally dominated the financial arena. For 
firms, financial markets’ instruments such as equity, commercial papers and corporate bonds 
provide a substitute to bank loans. For households, mutual funds, especially money market 
mutual funds (MMMFs), provide an alternative to bank deposits. Since their first appearance 
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growth. In her empirical study, Whiting (1994) argues that “…MMMFs now acquired share 
that would conceivably have gone to the banking institutions”. In assessing the desirability of 
this ongoing trend and of financial markets’ reforms, it would be important to acquire a better 
understanding of the way by which different types of financial systems affect real economic 
activity and business cycles. 
This paper provides a theoretic framework for the analysis and comparison of output 
cycles under two alternative financial systems: an equity-based mutual funds’ banking system 
versus a debt-based commercial banking system. I present a non-monetary, three-period 
model of an economy consisting of risk-averse households, risk-neutral entrepreneurs, and a 
competitive, risk-neutral financial intermediary. Households seek to secure future 
consumption through savings, whereas entrepreneurs seek to procure external funding in 
order to start up projects. Projects are subjected to both aggregate and idiosyncratic 
uncertainties that affect their risk of facing external funding constraints. Projects that face 
external funding constraints expire, while others, who succeed in procuring external funding, 
survive and generate positive returns. Two versions of the model are then developed: an 
equity-based financial system (EFS) version, in which the financial intermediary takes the 
form of a mutual fund, and a debt-based financial system (DFS) version, in which it takes the 
form of a bank. The mutual fund offers state-contingent thrift contracts to the households and 
equity-based, state-contingent funding contracts to the corporate sector; the bank, on the other 
hand, offers fixed-term deposit contracts to the households and debt-based, state-contingent 
loan contracts to the corporate sector
2. It can therefore be seen that EFS brings about some 
degree of risk sharing in the economy, whereas DFS isolates households form corporate 
sector’s risks. It is then shown that EFS induces savings to behave in a counter-cyclical 
                                                            
2 In the real world, mutual funds’ assets and liabilities vary in the same line, whereas banks assets are usually  
more volatile than their liabilities.    
   44manner, whereas DFS neither mitigates nor empowers exogenous cyclical forces. The paper 
points that the economy demonstrates milder output fluctuations under EFS than under DFS. 
It is important to note, however, that this result may be sensitive to the assumption regarding 
the respective bargaining power of entrepreneurs and the financial intermediary - a point to be 
hopefully examined in future research. The paper is organized as follows: sections 2 and 3 
present the equity and debt versions of the model, respectively; section 4 analyzes and 
compares the solutions for the model’s two versions, and finally, section 5 summarizes and 
highlights the main results.  
 
2. An Equity-Based Model 
Consider a small non-monetary economy consisting of entrepreneurs, households and a 
mutual fund. There are three periods (t = 0, 1, 2) and a single, non-storable good that serves as 
both capital and consumption good. All agents behave competitively and attribute the same 
importance to the different periods.  
Production in the economy is carried out through projects. A typical project requires an 
initial investment of one unit of capital in period 0 and matures two periods later. The 
project’s quality is unknown in period 0 and is publicly revealed in period 1 as either good or 
bad. A good quality project will generate an output of R > 1 units of capital in period 2. A bad 
quality project undergoes financial distress in period 1: it will turn unfruitful unless an 
immediate, crucial investment of α < R units of capital allows it to generate an output of R 
units of capital in period 2
3. Liquidation of a project prior to period 2 is assumed unattainable. 
Let  n ~ α stand for the quality contingent investment required by project n in period 1; let 
n q ~ be 
the random quality variable of project n that takes the values 0 (good) and 1 (bad), then: 
                                                            
3 The gross rate return is therefore R for a good-quality project and  α + 1
R for a bad-quality project that manages to 
procure α units of capital in period 1.   
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The following production function summarizes the ex-ante technology of project n: 
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1 are the amounts of capital invested i j
In addition to the idiosyncratic uncertainty concerning the quality of
subjected to a ertainty regarding the state of the world in the economy. Let  z ~ be a 
state of the world random variable that is resolved in period 1 as either h (high) or l (low) 
with probabilities θ  and 1-θ  respectively. The state of the world determines the fraction of 
good projects,  ) z ~ ( π , and that of bad projects, 1- ) z ~ ( π . State h is characterized by a higher 
proportion of good projects (and by the same token, a lower proportion of bad projects) with 
respect to state o that  1 ) h ( ) ( 0  l, s < < < π π l .  T x-ante compound probability that a 
project will reveal as being of a good quality is 
he e
π ≡ θπ(h) + (1-θ)π(l); accordingly, the 
complementary compound p roject will reveal as being of a bad quality is  robability that the p
(l)] - )[1 - (1   (h)]  - [1       - 1 π θ π θ π + ≡ . Figure 1 provides a schematic illustration of a typical 
project’s production process. 
2.1 The Agents 
 
.1.1 Entrepreneurs 
um of competitive entrepreneurs on the [0 , 1) interval, each endowed 
 of capital in period 0. A typical entrepreneur is risk-neutral and aims to 
ma
2
There is a continu
with 0 < ε < 1 units
ximize his period 2 consumption level. In period 0, each entrepreneur can engage in a 
single project. As a project requires an initial investment of one unit of capital in period 0, the 
   46entrepreneur will need a complementary external funding of 1-ε  units of capital to start up his 
project.  
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Initial investment of 
one unit of capital 
t  = 0   
t = 1   
z ~ The aggregate state-of –the –world,  , is resolved as 
either h or l with probabilities θ and 1-θ respectively.  
Simultaneously, the project’s quality is resolved:  
Probabilit
Project’s quality is bad 
equires α  
units of capital 
The project r
Project’s quality is good 
Project procures 
units of capital α   
Project fails to procure 
α units of capital 
Project expires. 
Liquidation 
value: null.   
Project y elds R > 1 
units of capital 
i Project yields R > 1 
units of capital 
t     = 2 t = 2   
y  ) z ~ ( π Probability  1 -  ) z ~ ( π    
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0
capital, he will eventually hold 1- ( 1 φ  of his project. 
In periods 0 and 1 the fund does not necessarily provide all the  my 
with the fundi
 the  o the fund, the funding needs of the 
pro
ancial distress in period 1, the entrepreneur will seek to procure the crucial investment of α 
units of capital by augmenting the fund’s total share in the project to  ) z ~ (
n
1 φ  so that 
1 ) z ~ (
n n ≤ ≤φ φ . Therefore, if entrepreneur n succeeds in procuring the additional α units of 
~ n
ng they need. The fraction of projects that eventually procure external funding 
in any given period depends upon capital inflow t
1
  ) z
projects in the econo
jects, the expected return on the projects’ shares and the fund’s opportunity cost for 
providing the projects with funding. Let 0 ≤ λ0 ≤  1 be the fraction of projects in the economy 
that are provided with external funding in period 0; a fraction 1- λ0  of the projects are 
therefore financially constrained and cannot be established. In the same manner, let 0 ≤  ) z ~ ( 1 λ  
≤ 1 stand for the state-dependent fraction of financially distressed projects that succeed in 
procuring α units of capital from the fund in period 1 and therefore, survive. A fraction 1-
) z ~ ( 1 λ  of financially distressed projects face external funding constraints and therefore  p
2.1.2 The Households 
e economy is populated by a unity of competitive, risk-averse households, each 
ex ire.  
  
Th
dowed with γ0 units of capital in period 0 and γ1 units of capital in period 1, where 0 < 
sehold  i’s utility from periodical consumption is captured by  the 
uti
period 1, the fund offers the households short-term saving contracts, yielding a state-
en







t stands for household i's consumption level in period t.  
Households cannot borrow; however, the mutual fund allows them to save in periods 0 and 1 
and thus, reallocate their resources. In period 0, the fund offers the households long-term 
saving contracts, yielding a state-contingent gross return rate  ) z ~ ( r 0  within two periods. In 
   48contingent gross return rate  ) z ~ ( r 1  within one period. Let 
i
0 s  and  ) z ~ ( s
i
1  represent the amounts 
of capital saved by household i in period 0 and period 1 state  z ~ ,  } , h { z ~ l ∈  respectively; 
then, in period 0, the household traces its state-contingent lif e consumption path by 
solving: 
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Restrictions (3a) – (3c) are the household’s onstraints hereas restrictions (3d) and 
(3e) stem from the household’s inability to borrow. Substituting (3a)-(3c) in (3) and solving 
for   and  yields the following first-order conditions: 
(4)  
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4) gives the first-order condition for  , household i’s savings in period 0; it states 
that the marginal utility from consumption in period 0 equals the expected utility from 
consumption in period 2. Equation (5) gi rder condition for  , household i’s 
i
0 s




   49state-dependent savings in  for any period 1; it states that   given state of the world, the marginal 
utility from consumption in period 1 equals the marginal utility from consumption in period 2.  
2.1.3 The Mutual Fund 
There is one competitive, risk-neutral mutual fund in the economy. The fund bears null 
1, th
nd, and alternative riskless assets
4. The terms of both types of assets are the same. In period 





operation costs and therefore does not charge any fees. In periods 0 and  e fund uses its 
liabilities - households’ savings - to build up its asset portfolio. Two types of assets are 
available to the fund: corporate shares, being the state-contingent liabilities of projects to the 
fu
0, alternative assets are 
iods; in period 1, alternative assets are short-term assets that yield a gross return rate of 
one in period 2. It is assumed that there exist no assets other than corporate shares and 
alternative riskless assets, and that the fund is the only agent in the economy that can purchase 
these types of assets. The alternative assets could be given several interpretations. They could 
represent foreign assets, government bonds or some capital storage technology that is 
available to the fund alone (a volt, for instance).  
The fund’s objective is to maximize its assets’ value in any given period. Being risk-
neutral it will therefore purchase, in any given period, the assets whose expected yields are 
the highest. It is assumed that the fund favors corporate shares over alternative assets yielding 
the same expected return.  
 
Figure 2 summarizes the course of actions in the m
Figure 2. The model’s time-line 
 






o -equilibrium of the model. Given 
ex-ante identi entical, a symmetric equilibrium 
odel is characte ntical projects and identical 
gs’ levels. This is  ing equations: 
a)   =  φ0                   n  
(6b)    =  φ1(h)         n 
                                                                                                                                                                     
t  =  1  
Aggregate and idiosyncratic 












2.2  Equilibr s  
This section presents the conditi
hat entrepreneurs are 
f the equity-version of the m
ouseholds’ savin
ns for a symmetric nash
cal and households are id
rized by ex-ante ide










1 φ   ∀
(6c)   ) ( 1 l φ  =  φ
n
1(l)           n  ∀
 
4 The reason for the inclusion of alternative assets is to provide the fund with an opportunity cost to purchasing corporate 
assets.  
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thus a fraction  ) z ~ ( 1 λ  of 
ects 
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t = 0    t = 2   
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i
0 s s =                     ∀i 
i (6e)  1 =           
i
1
the projects in the economy offer the mutual fund the 
share o ternal funding. Equations (6b) and (6c) state that for a given 
f the w r cts that undergo financial distress in period 1 offer the fund the 
same augmented share in return of an extra investment of α units of capital. Equation (6d) 
states that in equilibrium, all households save the same amount of capital in period 0. 
) and (6f) state that for a given state-of –the-world, all households save the same 
5
 (7)
) h ( s ) h ( s 1  ∀i
(6f)  ) ( s ) s 1 l l =           ∀i  (
 
Equation (6a) states that in period 0, all 
same   in exchange f r ex
state o orld, all the p oje
Equations (6e
amount of capital in period 1.     
It is assumed that entrepreneurs enjoy full bargaining power with respect to the fund  (this 
assumption is necessary to obtain a workable solution). Given (6a)-(6c), the fund’s 
equilibrium stipulation for providing an entrepreneur with the external funding he needs in 
period 0 is: 
   ) h ( )] h ( 1 [ R )] ( ) 1 ( ) h ( [ 1 0 λ π θ φ π θ θπ − + − + l [  α φ − R ) h ( 1 ]  +  ) ( )] ( 1 )[ 1 ( 1 l l λ π θ − −  [  α φ − R ) ( 1 l ]   
    ≥   ε − 1  
 
The right hand of condition (7) is the expected gross return to the fund from purchasing a 
share φ  of a typical domestic project in period 0. The fund takes into account that the project 
might undergo financial distress in period 1, a case in which the fund may salvage it in 
exchange for a larger share
0
  ) z ~ ( 1 φ or let it expire. The left hand of (7) is the opportunity cost 
of investing 1-ε units of capital in a typical project in period 0, embodied by the gross return 
                                                            
5 This assumption enables to obtain a workable solution of the model. In general, if the funds’ bargaining power is 
the model, which at this stage I would rather avoid.    
high, it might find it unworthy to supply capital to the corporate sector. Assuming a more balanced distribution of 
bargaining power between the entrepreneur and the fund would call for the use numeric methods in order to solve 
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assets. Therefore, the fund would be willing to venture 1-ε  units of  capital in a project in 
period 0 if the expected gross return it thus obtains is not inferior to the riskless gross return it 
could secure by purchasing alternative assets with the same amount of capital. In equilibrium, 
due to the competitive behavior of entrepreneurs and the fund, condition (7) holds with strict 
equality. It follows that in equilibrium, corporate shares and alternative assets offer the fund 
the same expected gross return in period 0. It is therefore obvious why alternative assets are 
needed: unless there were alternative assets, the fund would obtain null equilibrium gross 
return from corporate assets. In such case, the fund would deliver null returns to the 
households so that the households would be deprived of a thrift device.     
The fund’s stipulation for investing α units of capital in a financially distressed project in 
period 1 would be: 
(8)  R ) z ~ ( 1 φ  ≥  α     ,    } , h { z ~ l ∈  
The left hand of condition (8) is the fund’s state-dependent return from salvaging a financially 
distressed project. The right hand of (8) is the fund’s opportunity cost for doing so – the gross 
return it could obtain by investing α units of capital in alternative riskless assets. Condition 
(8) states that in period 1, the fund would be willing to salvage a distressed project if the gross 
return it thus obtains is not inferior to that offered by alternative assets. In equilibrium, due to 
the competitive behavior of entrepreneurs and the fund, condition (8) holds with strict 
equality; corporate shares and alternative assets therefore offer the fund the same gross return 
in period 1.  
Another feature of equilibrium is that the total inflow of capital to the fund equals the total 
outflow of capital from the fund in any given period. In period 0, the households save s0  units 
of capital that are placed in the fund. Let BB
in long-term alternative assets in period 0, then the equilibrium condition is: 
0 represent the units of capital invested by the fund 
   53(9)  s0 =  λ0(1 - ε) + B0 
The right hand of (9) is the total inflow of capital to the fund in period 0, whereas the left 
hand of (9) is the total outflow of capital from the fund in that period, consisting of 
inv
(10)  
estments in corporate shares and alternative assets. Investment in domestic assets in period 
0 sums up to λ0(1-ε) units of capital: the fund provides a fraction λ0 of the entrepreneurs in 
the economy with 1-ε units of capital, the external funding that each needs to start up his 
project. Rearranging (9) gives: 
ε − 1
Equation (10) presents the fraction of projects that eventually manage to procure external 
funding in period 0 as the ratio between the fund’s capital supply to the corporate sector and 
the corporate sector’s aggregate capital demand. In period 1, the state-dependent capital 
inflow to the fund is  ) z ~ ( s1 . The fund’s state-dependent capital outflow in period 1 consists of 
the purchase of financially distr
λ = 0  
essed projects’ shares and of alternative assets. In equilibrium, 
total capital inflow equals total capital outflow in period 1, for any given state of the world. 
Therefore:  
− B s 0 0
(11)   ) z ~ ( s =   ) z ~ ( B ) z ~ ( )] z ~ ( 1 [ 1   1 1 0 + − α λ λ π    ,     } , h { z ~ l ∈  
The right hand of equation (11) is the fund’s total state-dependent capital outflow in period 1, 
consisting of a total investment of  ) z ~ ( I1  units of capital. Total investments in period 1 consist 
of  α λ λ π ) z ~ ( )] z ~ ( 1 [ 1 0 −
) z
 units of capital that are invested in financially distressed projects 
and  ~ ( B1  units of capital that are invested in short-term alternative assets. Rearranging (11) 
yields: 
(12)   ) z ~ ( 1 λ  = 
α λ π 0
1 1
)] z ~ ( 1 [
) z ~ ( B ) z ~ ( s
−
−
       ,       } , h { z ~ l ∈     
   54The nominator in the right side of equation (12) is the fund’s capital supply to the domestic 
corporate sector in period 1: the f  total investments in period 1 minus its purchase of 
new he denominator in the right side of equation (12) is the financially 
distressed projects’ aggregate demand for external funding in period 1. Therefore, the fraction 
und’s
 alternative assets. T
of financially distressed projects that are salvaged is the ratio between the fund’s capital 
supply to the domestic corporate sector and the domestic corporate sector’s aggregate capital 
demand.  
Another feature of equilibrium is that the fund makes zero profits, regardless of the state-
of-the-world. The zero-profit condition means that in equilibrium, the fund does not keep for 
itself any part of the capital placed in it by the households. Let  ) z ~ ( B 1  be the state-dependent 
amount of capital invested by the fund in short-term alternative assets in period 1; then, the 
fund’s zero-profit equilibrium condition in period 1 is the following: 
) z ~ ( r




0 + ) z ~ (  =  R ) z ~ ( ) z ~ ( )] z ~ ( 1 [ R ) z ~ ( 1 1 0 0 0 φ λ λ π φ λ π − +   ) z ~ ( B B 1 0+ +   ,   } , h { z ~ l ∈   (13)  s1
The left hand of (13) is households’ total savings’ value in period 1 state  z ~ , that is, the fund’s
total liabilities at that time. The right hand of equation (13) is the fund’s total investments value 
  z
 
in period 1 state ~ ) z , that is, its total assets at that time: a share  0 φ  in  ~ ( π λ0 good projects, a 
share  ) z ~ ( 1 φ  in  ) z ~ ( )] z ~ ( 1 [ 1 0λ λ π − bad projects and a total investment of BB0 + ) z ~ ( B1  units of 
capital in alternative assets.  
 
In period 2, the value of the fund’s state-dependent liabilities to the households becomes 
) z ~ ( s ) z ~ ( r s ) z ~ ( r 1 1 0 0 +  units of capital. However, as the fund does not purchase additional assets 
in the concluding period, and since all uncertainties were resolved in period 1, the value of the 
fund’s assets remains the same as it was in period 1. Therefore, the fund’s zero-profits 
equilibrium condition in period 2 is the following:  
   55(14)  ) z ~ ( s ) z ~ ( r s ) z ~ ( r 0 0 +  =  1 1 R ) z ~ ( ) z ~ ( )] z ~ ( 1 [ R ) z ~ ( 1 1 0 0 0 φ λ λ π − +   ) z ~ ( B B 1 0+ +   ,   } , h { z ~ l ∈ λ π φ  
e in period 2 is the same as in period 1, the equilibrium value of 
e fund’s liabilities in period 1 is the same as in the beginning of period 2. Substituting (14) 
in 
(15)  
Since the fund’s assets’ valu
th
(13) yields: 
1 ) z ~ ( r1 =    ,         } , h { z ~ l ∈  
Equation (15) states that the equilibrium gross return rate offered by the fund on households’ 
savings in period 1 equals one, regardless of the prevailing state of the world. This is perfectly 
intuitive: since the fund does not charge any fees, the return on the assets it purchases in a 
given period equals the return gained by the households on the capital they placed at the fund 
e reduced to the following single zero-profits condition: 
(16) 
at the same period. As the equilibrium gross return rate on the assets purchased by the fund in 
period 1 is one, so will be the gross return rate on period 1 savings.  Given (15), conditions 
(13) and (14) ar
) z ~ ( s s ) z ~ ( r 1 0 0 +  =  R ) z ~ ( ) z ~ ( )] z ~ ( 1 [ R ) z ~   ) z ~ ( B B 1 0+ +   ,   } , h { z ~ l ∈ ( 1 1 0 0 0 λ π φ π − + λ φ λ  
In equilibrium, corporate shares offer the fund in period 0 an expected return that is equal to 
the riskless return offered by long-term alternative assets. As it is assumed that the fund 
favors corporate shares over alternative assets yielding the same return, it follows that:  
(17)  BB
ts yield the fund the 
same riskless return. As the fund favors corporate shares over alternative assets yielding the 
0 = max { s0 - 1 + ε  ,  0 } 
Equation (17) states that in equilibrium, the fund will purchase alternative assets in period 0 
only once the corporate sector’s financial needs are fully satisfied. In equilibrium, corporate 
shares of bad-quality salvaged projects and short-term alternative asse
same return, it follows that: 
(18)  ) z ~ ( B1  =  max {  α λ π 0 1 )] z ~ ( 1 [ ) z ~ ( s − −   , 0  }    ,      } , h { z ~ l ∈  
Equation (18) states that in equilibrium, the fund will purchase short-term alternative assets in 
eeds of financially distressed projects have been satisfied.  period 1 only once the financial n
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3. A Debt-Based Model 
In this version of the model, a competitive risk-neutral bank plays the role of financial 
intermediary. The bank is characterized by fixed liabilities and state-contingent assets, as 
opposed to the mutual fund in the former version of the model, whose both assets and 
liabilities were state-contingent.  
3.1 The Agents 
In period 0, the bank offers the corporate sector long-term loans, bearing a state-contingent 
gross interest rate 
 
3.1.1 Entrepreneurs 
) z ~ ( 0 ρ .  In period 1, given the materialized state of the world, the bank 
grants the corporate sector short-term loans, bearing a fixed gross interest rate of  ) z ~ ( 1 ρ .  
 The Households 
The bank offers the households fix-term saving contracts in periods 0 and 1 alike. In 
the households with a long term saving contract, bearing a fixed gross 




period 0, it provides 
interest rate r0. One 
seholds a short-term saving contract bearing a gross interest rate  ) z ~ ( r . The typical 
household traces its  al state-contingent lifetime consumption path by solving: 
(19) {
i
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Equa ) gives the f  conditio for , the household’s savings in period 0; it 
tates that the marginal utility from consumption in period 0 equals the expected utility from 
consumption in period 2. Equation (21) gives the first-order condition for  , the 
household’s state-dependent savings in period 1; it states that for any given state of the world, 
arginal utility from consumption in period 1 equals the marginal utility from 
consumption in period 2. 
 
3.2  Equilibrium Conditions  
This section specifies the symmetric equilibrium conditions of the debt version of the 
the debt version of the model as well.  
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model. Since households in the economy are identical, a symmetric equilibrium of the model 
is characterized by households’ identical saving decisions, that is, equations (6d)-(6f) apply to 
   58The bank’s stipulation for granting an entrepreneur with a loan of 1-ε  units of capital in 
period 0 is: 
  ] ) h ( ) h ( ) 1 )[( h ( )] h ( 1 [ ) ( ) 1 )( ( ) 1 ( ) h ( ) 1 )( h ( 1 0 1 0 0 α αρ ρ ε λ π θ ρ ε π θ ρ ε θπ − + − − + − − + − l l   (22)
         ] ) ( ) ( ) 1 )[( ( )] ( 1 )[ 1 ( 1 0 1 α αρ ρ ε λ π θ − + − − − + l l l l   ε − ≥ 1   
The left side of condition (22) is the expected pay back of the project to the bank in period 2. 
Th
neur 1-ε units of capital in period 0, taking the form of 
the
ition (22) therefore states that the bank would be willing to lend an entrepreneur 
nits of capital in period 0 if the expected payback of the loan is not inferior to the 
tunity cost of extending it. In equilibrium, du  to th mpetitive behavior of 
e bank takes into account the possibility that in any given state of nature, the project might 
undergo financial distress in period 1 - a case in which the bank may grant it an additional 
loan of α units of capital, or, alternatively, let it expire. The right side of (22) is the bank’s 
opportunity cost for lending an entrepre
 riskless gross return it can obtain by investing that amount of capital in long-term foreign 
assets. Cond
1-ε u
oppor e e co
entrepreneurs and the bank, condition (22) holds with strict equality.  
The bank’s stipulation for lending α units of capital to a financially distressed project in 
period 1 is:  
(23)  (1 - ε) ) z ~ ( 0 ρ  +  ) z ~ ( 1 αρ  ≥  α        ,         } , h { z ~ l ∈      
By extending the project a short-term loan of α units of capital in period 1, the bank 
guarantees itself the payback of the initial long-term loan and, in addition, is certain about the 
payback of the additional short-term loan; this is captured by the left side of equation (23). 
The right side of equation (23) is the opportunity cost of extending the project the additional 
short-term loan, embodied by the gross return that the bank can obtain by investing α units of 
capital in short-term foreign assets. In equilibrium, due to the competitive behavior of the 
entrepreneurs and the bank, condition (23) holds with strict equality. Note that  ) z ~ ( 1 ρ  can be 
   59) z ~ ( 1 ρ negative; a negative   is interpreted as the bank’s willingness to discharge a bad project 
part of its debts in state  z ~ .  
Other features of equilibrium are that (1) the capital inflow to the bank equals the capital 
outflow from the bank in any given period and state-of-the-world and (2) the bank favors a 
domestic asset over a foreign asset yielding the same return. It follows that equations (9)-(12) 
and (17)-(18) hold in the bank version of the model as well. 
Like the fund in the equity-based model, the bank makes zero profits in equilibrium, that 
is, it does not keep for itself any part of households’ savings and/or assets’ returns. In period 
1, the bank’s zero-profit equilibrium condition is: 
(24) 
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} , h { z ~ The right hand of (24) is the bank’s total asset’s value in period 1, state  l ∈ .In the 
beginning of period 2, the value of the bank’s state-dependent liabilities to the households is 
) z ~ ( r ) z ~ ( s r s 1 1 0
all uncertainties were resolved in period 1, the value of the bank’s assets remains the same as it 
was in period 1. Therefore, the bank’s zero-profit e
0 + . Since the bank does not purchase any additional assets in period 2 and as 
quilibrium condition in period 2 is:  
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+ BB   +  0 ) z ~ ( B1        ,         } , h { z ~ l ∈  
Since the bank’s assets’ value in period 2 is the same as in period 1, the equilibrium value of 
the bank’s liabilities in period 1 is the same as in period 2. Substituting (24) in (25) yields: 
(26)       ,         } , h { z ~ l ∈   1 ) z ~ ( r1 =
Equation (26) is, in fact, identical to equation (15) in the equity version of the model; it states 
that the equilibrium gross return rate offered by the bank on households’ savings in period 1 
   60equals one, regardless of the prevailing state of the world. Given (26), equatio d (25) 
are reduced to the following single equation: 
ns (24) an
(27)  ) z ~ ( s r s 1 0 0 +   )] z ~ ( ) z ~ ( ) 1 )[( z ~ ( )] z ~ ( 1 [ ) z ~ ( ) 1 )( z ~ ( 1 0 1 0 0 0 αρ ρ ε λ π λ ρ ε π λ + − − + − + B =  B0 +  ) z ~ ( B1
                              } , h { z
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4. Equity versus Debt: A Comparison 
This section presents, analyses and compares the outcomes of the equity and debt versions 
 
4.1 Equilibrium Solutions 
A prerequisite for the existence of equilibrium under both versions of the model is that the 
households’ optimal savings level in period 0 is strictly positive, that is, s0 > 0. To achieve 
considerable simplification, the equilibrium solutions that are presented for both versions of the 
model are confined to internal equilibria, that is, equilibria in which
of the model.  
  ) z ~ ( s1  > 0, 0 < λ0 < 1 and 0 
<  ) z ~ ( } , h { z ~ l ∈ 1 λ < 1 for  . The equilibrium levels of the variables in the equit




ersion of the model has two potential internal equilibria, stemming from two 
potential solutions for s . As the equilibrium analytical solutions for  are far too 
complicated to present, a full analytical equilibrium solution of the equity odel 
is unattainable. The equilibrium solution for  is such that satisfies equation (28a). Equations 
y and debt 
 
.1 Solution for the Equity Version  
The equity v
E E
0 s  




   61(28b) – (28j) present the internal equilibrium solutions for the rest of the endogenous variables 
in terms of parameters and 
E
0 s . 
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Lemma 1. has only one internal solution: the positive root of equation (28a).    
E
0 s  
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raigh ward implication of lemma 1 is that the equity-based model has a unique 
internal equilibrium.  
olution for the ased M del 
The debt-model has only one potential equilibrium. Equations (29a)-(29j) present the 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
The st tfor
 
4.1.2 S  Debt-B o
analytical equilibrium solution of the debt-based model: 
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4.2 Outcome Comparison 
 
   63Lemm T ons a 2.   he conditi  for the existence of internal equilibria for both the equity and the 
debt versions of the model are:   
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0 γ
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v.  if  ) 1 ( 2 0 ε γ − > , than an additional condition is that
of. See the Appendix  
 
Proposition 1.  
i.  Long-term savings are higher under DFS than under EFS, that is,  .  
denote  tween the two potential aggregate states 
of the world, so that 
  )] h ( 1 [ ) 1 ( 2 0 π α ε γ − + − <  
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   64iii
D
0 s is invariant to θ  whereas 
E
0 s is decreasing in θ for  θ θ .  ˆ <  and increasing in θ 
for  θ θ ˆ > , where θ ˆ  is some threshold value of θ  such that  2




0 s s ⎯ ⎯→ ⎯
→ θ          ,         
 
Proof. See the Appendix.  
The   fo n 1 d rather intricate; however, 
all three results simply reflect the negative  on long-term savings. DFS insulates 
households from technological aggregate risk by granting a fixed rate of return  =1 on 
long-term savings. EFS, by contrast, offers state-contingent rates of returns on -term 
savings -   and   - thus inducing households to provide the corporate sector partial 
insurance against aggregate technologic tions (28c) an (29c) indicate that the 
xpected rate of return on long-term savings under EFS equals the fixed rate of return on 
long-term savings under DFS: 
E E
The risk households are subjected to under EFS, reflected by uncertainty as to the potential 
 redu in s




0 s s ⎯ ⎯→ ⎯
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proofs r the results in propositio  are purely technical an
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(30)  0 0 0 r 1 ) ( r ) 1 ( ) h ( r = = − + l θ θ  
rates of return on long-term savings, has two opposite effects on  0 s . The substitution effect 
calls for a ction  0 , whereas the income effect triggers the “precautionary motive” 
that calls for an increase in 
E
0 s . The first result in proposition 1, stating that 
D
0 s  > 
E
0 s , is 
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   65hence, the higher β, the  s differentiated are  ) ( r
E
0 l  and  ) h ( r
E
0 . When  1 → les β  the potential 
states of the world, and therefore  ) ( r
E
0 l  and  ) h ( r
E
0 , converge. This means that fo →   1 β r ,
cial systems converge, and 
erefore . Given ho  a hi
 on 0 s
the precautionary motive - calls for the augmentation of  . The substitution effect of risk 
for the reduction of   Let   denote the variance of the state-contingent rate of 
Given equation (28c): 
 the 





0 s s → useholds’ risk-aversion, gher differentiation between  ) ( r
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0 l   th
and  ) h ( r
E  - that is, a lower β  - exerts two oppos ffects
E . The income effect of risk – 
E
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return on long-term savings under EFS, which reflects the risk EFS casts onto households. 
(32) 
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Equation (33) states that β has a negative effect on the risk faced by households under EFS. 
This result is quite intu
0
−
− =   <  0 
itive: the higher β, the more differentiated the potential rates of return 
ng-term savings, and hence, the greater the risk households face. The finding that  is 
increasing in β indicates the dominance of the substitution effect of risk, that is, a negative 
effect of risk on  .   
egate technological risk is also affected by θ,  the probability for state h. Under DFS 









   66term saving contracts are state-contingent so that 
E
0 s  is affected by θ. Equation (28c) 
indicates that both  ) ( r
E  and  ) h ( r
E  decrease in θ :  0 l 0
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The substitution effect of an increase in θ on   works via θ’s impact on the risk faced by 
ect to θ yields: 
 
The income effect of an increase in θ on 
E s  therefore pulls at the direction of reducing 
E s . 
E
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for  An increase in θ therefore increases the risk faced by households under EFS 
) 1 /( β β θ + ≤ ,  and decreases that risk for  ) 1 /( β β θ + > .  As risk was found to exert a 
negative effect on  E
0 s , an increase in θ on  E
0 s  will negatively affect  for    E
0 s ) 1 /( β β θ + ≤  
and positively affect it for  ) 1 /( β β θ + > . It follows that for  ) 1 /( β β θ + ≤  both the income 
and substitution effects generated by a rise in θ lower 
E
0 s ; for  ) 1 /( β β θ + > , the 
substitution effect induced by a rise in θ mes positive, and thus contradicts the negative 
income effect. The findings show that   is negatively affected by θ as long as 




θ θ β β ˆ ) 1 /( < < +  incom θ θ ˆ >   the 
findings point that   is positively affected by θ, thus indicating the dominance of θ‘s  E
0 s
   67substitution effect. hen either  0 →   W θ  or  1 → θ , EFS provides hous olds w t 
certain return that converg ows that for either 
eh ith an almos
es to  l 1. It fol 0 → θ  or  1 → θ  the long-term 
0 0 0 → θ 0 1 0 → θ 0
3: 
Figure 3: The effect  θ on  E
0 s  
 
 
saving contracts offered to households under EFS converge with those offered under DFS. 
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ii.  Short-term savings under DFS are higher than short-term savings under EFS in state 
h, yet lower than short-term savings under EFS in state l, that is, 
.  
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   68Proof. see the Appendix.  
 the first result in proposition 2 goes as follows: the level of   is affected 
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1 The intuition for
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1 , the state-dependent rate of return on short-term




0 . Since equation (28f) indicates that  ( r
E
1
or  } , h { z
) z ~
~ l ∈ , the level of  ) z ~ ( s
E  depends exclusively upon the value of long-term savin
8e) reveal that 
1 gs. 
8d) and (2
E , indicating that the value of long-term 
h than in state l. The value of long-term savings exerts both a 
me effect and a (negative) substitution effect on  . The findings show that 
he b
rt-term
financially distressed projects is low
6. Under DFS, short-term savings are state-invariant, and 
itigate 
omy, it woul
As for the second result in proposition 2, the intuition goes as follows. As equations (28f) and 
(29d) indicate that under both financial systems the rate of return on short-term savings is 
one, the only source of difference between   and   would be the value of long-term 
                                                          
Equations (2 ) h ( r ) ( r 0
E
0 < l
savings is higher in state 
(positive) inco ) z ~ ( s
E
1




1 l < ,  thus indicating the dominance of the substitution effect. T ehavior of 
sho  savings under EFS is therefore counter-cyclical: short-terms savings are high when 
the percentage of financially distressed projects is high, and low when the percentage of 
therefore neither enhance nor m exogenous cyclical forces. Since households’ savings 
are the only source of capital in the econ d be plausible to expect EFS to generate 
milder output cycles than DFS. 
 








0 s s < (proposition 1), it follows that the value of 
long-term savings under DFS is higher than that under EFS when state l materializes, that is, 






6 It is however important to state that in a multi-period framework, if a negative shock in period 1 is a signal to 
future negative shocks, the behavior of savings could go the opposite way.    








0 r s . Therefore, the negative impact of long-term savings’ value on the level of 




impact of long-term savings’ value on the level of short-term savings is weaker under DFS, 
hence 
E s ) h ( s < . 
  
 
capital in the economy. Consequently, the comparative levels and cycles of output under DFS 
and EFS can be explained solely on the grounds of the comparative behavior of both long-
term and short-term savings.   
an output of  units of capital, the economy’s aggregate output is simply R times the 
mber of projects that have survived to the last period. Let 









not as straightforward. As that  0 0 r 1 ) h ( r , it is not clear at first glance whether the value 
of long-term savings under DFS is higher or lower than that under EFS in state h.  In the 
Appendix,  0 0 r s  is proved to be lower tha h ( r0 0  thus indicating that the negative 
1 1
4.2.2 Output Levels and Cycles  
Under both financial systems, households’ savings constitute the one and only source of 
In period 2, projects that have survived finally mature. Given that each of these projects 
yields   R
D
D   )
D
) z ~ ( Y  denote the level of output in  nu
state  z ~ , then: 
R )]} z 1 0 0 π λ λ π λ − + ≡   ,   } , h { z ~ ( 1 )[ z ~ ( ) z ~ ( { ) z ~ ( Y ~ l ∈   (36) 
Note that equation (36) applies for both financial systems. The expression  ) z ~ ( 0π λ  in the 
right hand of equation (36) is the total number of good projects in state  z ~ , whereas 
)] z ~ ( 1 )[ z ~ ( 1 0 π λ λ −  signifies z ~  the total number of bad salvaged projects in state  . 
Substituting equations (28b), (28g) and (28h) in equation (36) yields the equilibrium state-
dependent level of output under EFS: 
   70(37)  ( Y  =  ) z ~ E R













      ,       l    
ituting equations (10), (12), (29b), (29i) and (29j) n equation (36) yields the equilibrium 
state-dependent of output under DFS: 
Subst  i
(38)  ) z ~ ( Y
D  =  R
s
1
s ) z ( 1 0 ⎥ ⎢ +
− α ε
π





⎡ ~ l ∈   
In this model, the expected level of output could be interpreted as potential output. Let 
E Y and 
D Y denote the expected output under EFS and DFS respectively; then, by 
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0  +  (40) 
D Y = 
α ⎦ ⎣ − α ε 2 1 2
Proposition 3.   
  Output trough is higher under EFS than under DFS if  
R 1  
 
i.  Under both financial systems state h output (henceforth output peak) is higher 
than state l output (henceforth output trough)  




) ( 1 2
















Ex cted (potential) ou t is higher under DFS than under EFS. 
pendix.  
 
iv.  pe tpu
 
Proof. See the Ap
   71Equations (37) – (38) present the state-dependent output levels under the two alternative 
short-term savings. Long-term 
savings constitute the capital supply to the corporate sector in the initial period, and thus, 
determine the number of projects that eventually start up. Out of the 
financial systems as being determined by long-term and 
) 1 /( s0 ε −  projects that 
are established in period 0, a fraction  ) z ~ ( π  are of good quality, and thus will generate 
[ ] ) 1 /( Rs ) z ~ ( 0 ε π −  units of capital in t e final period. The positive effect of long-term 
 output under both financial systems is therefore strengthened the higher 
h
savings’ on
entrepreneurs’ capital endowment ε, and the larger the state-contingent fraction of good 
projects in the economy,  ) z ~ ( π . Short-term savings too positively affect output under both 
financial systems. As short-term savings constitute the capital supply to financially distressed 
projects, the number of salvaged projects is  α / ) z ~ ( s
E
1  under EFS a  under DFS; 
accordingly, short-term savings’ contribution to output will be  α / R ) z ~ ( s
E
1  under EFS and 
. Note that in the case of EFS, short-term savings’ effect on output is 
counter-cyclical (see proposition 2), whereas under DFS this effect is state-invariant. Under 
both financial systems, a high α reduces short-term savings’ positive effect on output.  
 
Let ΔY denote the peak-trough gap, then: 
1) ΔY ≡ Y(h) – Y(l) 





the gap between the levels of output in state h and l under EFS:  
  α / s
D
1
α / R s
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Substituting (38) into (41) for both states of the world gives the equilibrium expression for the 
gap between the levels of output in state h and l under DFS: 













Proof.  Given that   (proposition 1) and that  (proposition 2), 
equations (42) and (43) indicate that 
   









1 l <  
E D Y Y Δ Δ > . ■ 
avior of savings under the two 
ative financial systems. Given that   (proposition 1), the number of projects 
at start-up in the first period under DFS is larger than under EFS -   versus 
. Therefore, the reduction in the number of good quality projects when shifting 
to state l is larger under DFS than under EFS:
 




0 s s < altern
th ) 1 /( s
D
0 ε −
) 1 /( s
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0 ε −
from state h  [ ] ) 1 /( s ) ( ) h (
D
0
0 ε π π − − l ; hence, the g
ε π π − − l  versus 
ap in the output of good-quality projects is larger under 
FS than under EFS. Given that the shift from state h to state l raises the 
nu
t-term
 of the w
follows tha
rm savings further redu
the peak-trough gap under EFS with respect to that under DFS. 
 
[] ) 1 /( s ) ( ) h (
E




1 l < , 
mber of salvaged bad-quality projects from  α / ) h ( s
E
1  to  α / ) ( s
E
1 l , thus creating a 
counter-cyclical effect. Under DFS, shor vings are state-invariant; therefore, the 
number of salvaged bad quality projects is  α / s
D
1  regardless of the sta orld. It 
t under DFS short-term savings neither reinforce nor mitigate the exogenous 
cyclical forces. It follows that the comparative behavior of short-te ces 
 4.2.4 Welfare Implications 
 sa
te
   73Proposition 5. Households’ lifetime utility under DFS is higher than their expected lifetime 
utility under EFS.   
 
Proof. The two financial systems differ only with respect to the long-term saving contracts 
they offer to households: state-contingent contracts under EFS, versus fixed contracts under 
DFS, where the expected return on long-term savings under EFS is equal to the fixed return 
un en households’ risk aversion, their expected utility will be 
In the last period entrepreneurs consume their corporate gains. Let   stand for 
der DFS (see equation (30)). Giv
higher under DFS than under EFS.■ 
 
) z ~ ( G
E
entrepreneurs’ equilibrium corporate gains under EFS in state  } , h { z ~ l ∈ , then: 
(44)  ) z ~ ( G










0 φ π λ λ φ π λ − − + −  
Substituting equations (28e) – (28h) in equation (44) and rearranging yields: 




































E G  = s0 + ⎥ ⎢ −  
Let  denote entrepreneurs’ equilibrium corporate gains under DFS in state  ) z ~ ( G
D   } , h { z ~ l ∈ , 
then: 
(47) 
Substituting equations (29e) – (29h) in equation (47) and rearranging yields: 
) z ~ ( G












0 αρ ρ ε π λ λ ρ ε π λ − − − − + − −  
(48)  ) z ~ ( =  G
D
α
α γ α π ) R ( R R ) z
α ε 2 2 1
~ (
s 1 D −
+ ⎤ ⎡ +
−   0 ⎥ ⎦ ⎢ ⎣ −
Let 
D G  stand for entrepreneurs’ expected gains under DFS, then: 
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D G  =  (49) 
α ε 2 2 1 ⎦ ⎣ −
 
Proposition 6. Entrepreneurs’ welfare is higher under DFS than under EFS. 
. See Appendix.  
 
The intuition for this result goes as follows: EFS induces the risk-averse agents – households - 
vid surance to the risk-neutral agents - entrepreneurs. As the households require an 
pensation for sharing corporate sector’s risks, entrepreneurs would rather not 
re in the economy is higher under DFS than under EFS.  
Proposition 7 states that DFS Pareto-dominates EFS. The intuition behind this result is 
h the risk-averse agents – households – 
insurance to the risk-neutral agents – entrepreneurs. It is important to note that 
 the 
 risk-aversion (the assumption that households are risk-averse and 
so hold under the more general (and realistic) 
mption that entrepreneurs’ risk-aversion is milder than households’. It is also important to 
 
Proof
to pro e in
appropriate com
be insured at all – which is the case under DFS.  
 
Proposition 7. Total welfa
 
Proof. Combine propositions 5 and 6. ■ 
 
simple. EFS creates an inefficient situation in whic
provide 
although the welfare implications of the model are straightforwardly implied by
configuration of agents’
entrepreneurs are risk-neutral), they will al
assu
point that the relaxation of the assumption that households and entrepreneurs are separate 
entities (that is, that households do not own projects) may lead to different welfare statements.  
5. Concluding Remarks 
   75The paper shows that the financial system’s configuration affects real activity levels and 
cycles. This non-neutrality stems from the different patterns of risk sharing induced by each 
financial system and the resulting behavior of savings, set by consumption-smoothing risk-
averse households. By offering households state-contingent long-term saving contracts, EFS 
induces them to share the corporate sector’s aggregate technological risk. DFS, by contrast, 
provides households with fixed long-term saving contracts, thus isolating them from 
technological uncertainties. Given that households are risk-averse, each financial system 
yields a different consumption-smoothing saving’s path. DFS produces higher long-term 
savings than EFS; hence the number of projects that are established under DFS is larger. In 
the interim, EFS generates counter-cyclical short-term savings, whereas DFS produces state-
invariant short-term savings that neither enhance nor mitigate the exogenous cyclical forces; 
consequently, the peak-trough gap is milder under EFS than under DFS. As large output 
cycles are usually conceived as undesired phenomena, this result raises an important point in 
favor of EFS.  But the results also raise a number of arguments against EFS. EFS generates 
lower output peaks than DFS and under some conditions, deeper output troughs. Potential 
output is lower under EFS. Welfare wise, EFS creates an inefficient risk-sharing pattern that 
induces the risk-averse sector (households) to share the risks of the risk-neutral sector 
(entrepreneurs). Consequently, EFS is Pareto-dominated by DFS, which insulates the two 
sectors. This result holds as long as households are assumed to be more risk-averse than 
entrepreneurs – which seems to be the case in the real world. In the end of the day, the paper 
does not imply that one financial system should be preferred to the other; this question should 
be dealt with within a more comprehensive discussion that takes into account not only real 
activity and welfare considerations but also financial stability, political aspects etc. The 
contribution of the paper to the equity-versus-debt debate is in focusing on the so far 
untreated facet of real activity and welfare implications of financial systems, and in 
presenting the pros and cons of each system on the ground of a theoretical model. It is 
   76however important to point that the results could be sensitive to the specific configurations of 
relative bargaining power, agents’ set of alternatives etc. A challenge for future research 
would be to overcome the limitations of the present model whilst preserving the ability to 
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In equilibrium both (7) and (8) hold with strict equality. Substituting (8) for both states of the 
world in (7) yields: 








where  π ) ( ) 1 ( ) h ( l π θ θπ − + ≡
 a typical firm in 
entrepreneur in his own firm, and 
. It can be seen that the equilibrium share offered to the 
fund by period 0 is decreasing in ε, the amount of capital invested by the 
R, the gross return generated by a project that survives to 
period 2.  is also a decreasing function of π(h), π(l) and  θ,  given that 
E
0 φ
π(h) > π(l) . Substituting (i.1) in (8) gives: 




1 ) z ~ ( φ φ  
R
α
        ,        } , h { z ~ l ∈  
It can be seen from equation (i.2) that in equilibrium  ) z ~ (
E
1 φ  is not state-dependent and can 




therefo eriod 1, a financially distressed firm issues the same share 
for both states of the world. Since R > α  , it is obvious that 
E
1 φ  is smaller than 1. 





⎤ ⎡ − + =
π π ) z ~ (
1
B ) z ~ (
) z ~ ( r
E
0 E    ⎢ ⎣ π π s
E
0
0    ,      } , h { z ~ l ∈  
Since  π(l)  <  π(h) it follows from equation (i.3) that  , that is, the gross 
). 
 





return rate on households’ period 0 savings is higher if the state of the world is revealed to be 
h. Equation (i.5) also indicates that  ) h ( r
E
0  is increasing in π(h) and decreasing in π(l), and 
accordingly  ) ( r
E l  is increasing in π(l) and decreasing in π(h 0
   78Substituting (14) and (i.3) in (5), taking account of restriction (3e) and rearranging yields: 
= max { ) z ~ ( s
E











π γ ) z ~ ( B
2
s ) z ~ (
2
E E
0 1   ,   }  ,         } , h { z ~ l ∈    (i.4) 
Since  π(l)  <  π(h) it follows from equation (i.4) that  that is, the typical 
household saves more in period 1 if the materialized state of the world is l.  
     
Substituting ( 18) yields: 




1 ≥ l , 
10) in (
i.5 = max ) ) z ~ ( B
E







)] z ~ ( 1 )[ B s (





1   , 0}        ,        } , h { z ~ l ∈    (





s )]( z ~ ( 1 [ 2
E
0 −π π α
 , 1} if   ) z ( s1 >
1
 0    if   0 ) z ~ ( s
E =                                                              








− − − − ε π π π γ π ~ E   
 (i.6) λ  =    
               
 
0
) z ~ (
E
1
} , h { z ~ l ∈  
Subst g (i.3) an world in (4) y itutin d (i.4) for both states of the  ields an equation in . 
high-order equation in  ; in case 








0 B  
E
0 s : 





2 E − + − + γ γ π γ π π γ π π π γ π π l l l  
on (i.7 e simplified to 
 
(i.8)  { s 3 β θ θ γ β γ β θ θ β γ β − + + − − + + +  
s )






0 s } ] ) 1 ( [ 2 2 ] ) 1 ( )[ 1 (
0 ] ) 1 ( )[ 2 (
2
0 1 1 = − + − + β θ θ γ γ γ  







= . The solution of (i.8) gives 
E s  in terms of θ, β, γ0 and γ1. There are two  0






ii. Solving the Debt Version of the M  
 equilibrium both (22) and (23) hold with strict equality. Substituting (23) in (22) yields:  In
(ii.1)  1 ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) h ( ) h ( 0 0 = − + l l ρ π θ ρ θπ  
Substituting (ii.1) in (23) for state h gives: 
(ii.2)  ) (









Rearranging (36) for sta  l yields: 
1
) h (
1 ) h (
D
D
















Substituting  (10), (11) (17) and (23) in (27) yields: 
(ii.4) 
] B s )[ z ~ (
B s r




0 0 D −






























ρ =   (ii.6) 
Substituting (ii.6) in (ii.1) yields: 




D ρ =    0 π











− =  










− =   
Substituting (10), (11) (17), (23) and (ii.7) in (27) for state h (arbitrary) yields: 
), taking account of restriction (19e): 
=  ax 
1 r
D
0 =   (ii.10) 
Substituting  (26) and (ii.10) in (21








0 1 − γ
 ,  0 }   
d (ii.11) in (20) taking account of restriction (19d) yields: 
=  min{ 

















2 0 1 γ γ −
 ,  0}  (ii.13)





















= 1 0 2γ γ ≥  and  .  
 
Substituting (ii.12) in (10) gives: 





0 λ  












 , 1 } 
   81Substituting (ii.13) and (ii.14) in (19): 
min{ 
)] z ~ ( 1 )[
0
γ α 2 (













=      ,  1  }  if  
−
(ii.15)  =                                                                                                                   
                                                                       
 
as & Propositions
) z ~ (
D
1 λ   
0      if     0 s
D =    1
     
} , h { z ~ l ∈  
III. Proofs of Lemm  





) ( ) h ( 3 a l π π ≡ ,  ) ( ) h ( 2 ] 2 ) ( ) h ( [ b 0 1 l l π π γ π π π π γ − + + ≡  and  ) 2 ( c 0 1
2
1 γ γ π γ − ≡ . 
It can be seen that a and  b could be either positive or negative. The 




0 s   tw
a 2







=   
ac 4 b b
2 − + −
a 2
) s ( 1
E
0 =       ;      
ac 4 b b
2 − < Since –4ac > 0, it follows that   so that   > 0 and   < 0. The 
equilibrium solution for s  is therefore  .  
 
Proof of lemma 2: ite for e existence of equilibrium in general for the equity 
version of the model  ithin range and that the 
fund’s share in bad salvaged projects is larger than its share in good quality projects. This is 
ummarized by the requirement that 0 < 
1
E
0 ) s ( 2
E




0 ) s ( 0
 A prerequis  th
is that projects’ shares held by the fund are w
 <  1 φ 0 φ < 1. Given that ε < 1 equation (28e) 
                                                          
s
 
7 A prerequisite for the existence of an internal equilibrium is  .   
0 1 2γ γ >
   82indicates that  0 φ  is strictly positive. Given that α < R, it is always true that  1 φ <
(28e) and (28f) indicate that 
 1. Equations 
 <  1 φ 0 φ if and only if  π α ε − > 1 .  
existence of equilibrium, an internal equilibrium 
for the model under EFS requires that  > 0 , 
 
In addition to the above prerequisites for the 
E
0 s ) z ~ ( s
E
1  > 0, 0 <  < 1 and      0 < 
E
0 λ ) z ~ (
E
1 λ < 1, 




) z ~ (
parameters that yield 
E






 > 0 if  <
  s of   world, and as
. Since 
this condition has to ho for both state the ld   ) h ( ) ( π π < l , a sufficient 




1 E γ π
< ε λ   s . Equation (28g) indicates that since   < 1,  0 is positive if  0  
is positive; the condition for 
E λ < 1 is that 




E λ  is  1
) z ~ ( s
E
1  is positive, whereas the condition for  ) z ~ (
E
1 λ positive if  <  1 is that 
) 1 )( h ( )] h ( 1 [ 2
s0 ε π π π α
) 1 ( 1 E γ ε π
− +
< . Consequently, the prerequisites for the existence of 




) 1 )( h ( )] h ( 1 [ 2
) 1 ( 1












}. This prerequisite is plausible only if 
) 1 )( h ( )] h ( 1 [ 2
) 1 ( 1






) h ( π
1 γ π
}.  As in equilibrium  π α ε − > 1 ,   it follows that 
) 1 )( h ( )] h ( 1 [ 2
) 1 ( 1














, ion for   the condit
) 1 )( h ( )] h ( 1 [ 2
) 1 ( 1
ε π π π α
ε γ π
− + −
< 1-ε   is that 
−
)] h ( 2 [ 1 π α γ − < .  
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D ,   1 0
D  and  1 ) z ~ (
D < λ   } , h { z 0 1 > 0 < < λ 1 < , for ~ l ∈ . Equation (29a) indicates that 
0 s







γ > . According to equation (29g),   is  is positive; whereas the 
D D
condition for  1
D
0 < λ  is that  ) 1 ( 3 2 0 1
0 λ positive if  0 s
) z ~ (
D
1 λ ε γ γ − − > . Equation (29h) indicates that   is 
positive if   is  e condition for 
D
1 s positive, whereas th 1 ) z ~ (
D
1 < λ is 
) 1 ( 2 )] z ~ ( 1 [
} 1 )] z ( 1 [ 2 { 0
1 ε π α




<  .  It can be seen that since 
0
0 2
) 1 ( 2 )] z ~ ( 1 [
} 1 )] z ~ ( 1 [ 2 {
γ
ε π α




, the condition for existence of internal equilibrium for 




 , 2γ0 − 3(1 − ε) } < γ1  < 
) 1 ( 2 )] h ( 1 [
0
π α
} 1 )] h ( 1 [ 2 {
ε
γ α −π + −ε
− + −
 
his condition is plausible if max{  , 2γ0 − 3(1 − ε)} < 
) 1 ( 2 )] h ( 1 [
} 1 )] h ( 1 [ 2 { 0
ε π α





T . It can 




) 1 ( ε α 2 )] h ( 1 [







2γ0 − 3(1 − ε) < 
as the condition for  
) 1 ( 2 )] h ( 1 [
} 1 )] h ( 1 [ 2 { 0
ε π α








− <   is that  .  Therefore, in 
case 2γ0 − 3(1 − ε)  >  
2
0 γ
, an additional requirement is that 
2
) h ( 1 [
1
0 π α γ
ε
− −
− < .  
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
   84(i) The right hand of equation (28a) is a polynum ) ( P ⋅  in  0 s .  Following the proof for lemma 
E
1, it can be seen that  b as 2
s














) ( P 2 − =
⋅ ∂
 > 0 and 
ac 4 b
) ( P 2
E − − =
⋅ ∂
 < 0, an
s













 > 0. Consequently  is U-shaped. 
Therefore, in order to prove that in equilibrium one has to show that   has a 





0 s s <   ) ( P ⋅
2
2
1 0 positive value at 
D
0 s . Substituting   in  ) ( P ⋅  yields 
D
0 s 1 )] ( π θ γ l
 
> 0; therefore  0 s < . 
) h ( 3
) h ( )[ 2 )( 1 (
π
π γ γ θ − − −












≡ into  ) ( P ⋅ (ii Substituting   yields a polynum  ) ( ' P ⋅  of  , with coefficients 
ely. The derivative of    with 
spect to β is 
E
0 s a’, b’ 

















. Since  E
0 s
) ( ' P
∂
⋅ ∂
  > 0 at the vicinity of xt 
f β i  sh
  
E
0 s , the ne re
β ∂
⋅ ∂ ) ( ' P
step in proving that 
E
0 s  is an increasing function o s to ow that   < 0. Calculating 
β ∂
⋅ ∂ ) ( ' P
 and rearranging yields: 
 
) 2 s 2 )( 1 )( 1 ( 2 ] s ) 1 ( 2 )[ 2 s 3 (





0 1 0 1
E
0 γ γ β θ θ γ β θ γ γ γ
β















=  one can see that 
 and hence, that  . Consequently 1 0
E
0 2 s 3 γ γ − < 1 0
E
0 2 s 2 γ γ − < , 
β ∂
⋅ ∂ ) ( ' P






0.  Substituting β = 0 in (28a) yields 
D















= , whereas substituting β 
























⎯ ⎯→ ⎯ →  and   .  
 






































∂ ∂ θ θ
. It has already been shown that   > 0. Differentiating  ) ( ' P ⋅  
with respect to θ yields  } s ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( )[ 2 s 2 ( 2 ){ 1 (
) ( ' P E
0 0 1
⋅ E






⋅ ∂ ) ( ' P
 > 0 iff 
D E s
] ) 1 ( ( 2
s 0
1 0
0 ] ) 1 ( [ 4 1
[ 6
] ) 1 [ 4 1
] ) 1 ( )[ 2
β θ θ β
β θ θ γ γ θ
β θ θ β
β θ
− + + +
− +
=
− + + +
+ − −
>  and 
 
θ ∂
⋅ ∂ ) ( ' P
vice versa for  < 0. Using the result  0 , it can be seen that a sufficient though 
not necessary condition for
D
0






⋅ ∂P ) ( '
 < 0, and hence for   > 0, is that  5 . 0 > θ . Given that 
E D
0 0 s s =  for either θ =0 or θ =1 and that 
θ ∂
∂ ⋅) ( ' P
ld value of θ  that is 
 is continuous in θ , there is some non-
negative thresho smaller than 0.5, θ :  ˆ













































   for
The value of   depends on β. Since 









β⎯ ⎯→ ⎯ →  one can easily see that 
+
0 ˆ




0 s s ⎯ ⎯→ ⎯ → β 5 . 0 ˆ
1 ⎯ ⎯→ ⎯→ β θ . 
However, the derivative of   with respect to β is rather complicated, and does not enable a 
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Proof of proposition 2:Given that π(l) < π(h), equation (28b) indicates that  . 
Substituting equations (29c) and (29d) in equation (21) yields 














; given that 
(proposition 1) and π(l) < π(h), equation (28b) indicates that: 




0 s s <  













) h ( s s




0 s ] ) 1 ( [ s β θ θ − + >   > 1 1
   87In order to prove that  one has to show that the positive root of 
 (see proof of proposition 1) is larger than  or, alternatively, 





0 s ] ) 1 ( [ s β θ θ − + > , 
) ( P ⋅
D
0 s ] ) 1 ( [ β θ θ − + , 
) ( P ⋅
D
0 s ] ) 1 ( [ β θ θ − +
D
0 0 s ] ) 1 ( [ s β θ θ − + =
) ( P ⋅   ] ) 1 ( )[ 1 )( 1 ( 2 ) 1 )( 1 ( 2 1 0 β θ θ β θ γ β θ β γ − + − − + − − , which given that β < 1 is 
1
Proof of Proposition 3:     
Equation (37) indicates that  iff  
negative. Therefore,  ) h ( s s
E D > .  
 
1
) ( Y ) h ( Y
E E l >  
α ε
π π ) h ( s ) ( s
s
1











Substituting equation (29b) in the above condition and rearranging yields: 
l >   iff ) ( Y ) h ( Y
E E    π α ε 2 1− >  
Since one of the require of an internal equilibrium for both the EFS 
FS models is 
ments for the existence 
and D π α ε − >1  (see lemma 2), it is obv ) (
E l . 
 
n that π( ) l .  
 
ious that Y ) h ( Y
E >
Give l) < π(h), equation (38) indicates that  >
Equations (37) and (38) indicate that: 
 Y
D(h)  iff   
 























1 s ) h ( s <  (proposit t 
E
0 s < s 
obviously fulfilled.  
ion 2) and tha s  (proposition 1), the condition i
Equations (37) and (38) indicate that:  
  iff   
D
0
) ( Y ) ( Y























   88Substituting equations (21), (28b), (29c) and (29d) in the above condition and rearranging 
yields:  
) ( Y ) ( Y





) ( 1 2















Finally, given that  (proposition 1) equations (39) and (40) indicate that expected 
(potential) output is higher under DFS than under EFS.  
 
Proof of Propositio rs are risk-neutral, their expected gains can be used as 
asure. Given
E







ale (1997): “Financial Markets, Intermediaries and Intertemporal 




0 s s <  
n 6: As entrepreneu
a welfare me  that  0 0 s s <  (proposition 1) equations (46) and (49) indicate that 
entrepreneurs’ expected gains are higher under 
D
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